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Abstract
Network security is of vital importance for corporations and institutions. In order to protect valuable
computer systems, network data needs to be analyzed so that possible network intrusions can be detected.
Supervised machine learning methods achieve high accuracy at classifying network data as normal or
malicious, but they require the availability of fully labeled data. The recently developed ladder network, which
combines neural networks with unsupervised learning, shows promise in achieving a high accuracy while only
requiring a small number of labeled examples. We applied the ladder network to classifying network data
using the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition dataset (KDD
1999). Our experiments, show the ladder network was able to achieve similar results compared to supervised
classifiers while using a limited number of labeled samples.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Network security is essential to corporations as intrusions can result in massive 
monetary losses. According to a report by the Ponemon Institute, which sampled 
252 companies in 7 countries, the U.S. continues to rank highest in its cost of 
cybercrime at an annual average of $15.4 million per company (Ponemon 
Institute, 2015). Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are either signature 
based or anomaly based. Signature based detection methods require the attack to 
be documented beforehand, thus new types of attacks that are not yet documented 
cannot be detected. Anomaly based detection methods focus on finding unknown 
or unusual activity patterns in the observed data (Holtsnider & Jaffe, 2010). They 
allow new attacks to be discovered, however a domain expert is required to 
analyze the anomalies. 
Network data has been classified by a host of machine learning techniques. 
Among the literature we reviewed included the work of Jadidi et al (2013), who 
used Support Vector Machines (SVM) and flow based data sets to classify 
network data as benign or malicious. Salama et al. (2011) have used a hybrid 
intrusion detection scheme utilizing both Support Vector Machines and Deep 
Belief Networks. Hasan and his colleagues have developed two IDS models: one 
that uses SVMs and the other that uses the Random Forest Classifier (Hasan, 
Nasser, Pal, & Ahmad, 2014). Haweliya and Nigam used a semi-supervised 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify an optimized version of the KDD 
1999 dataset (Haweliya & Nigam, 2014). 
Though supervised learning methods achieve high accuracy, they require fully 
labeled data. Acquiring fully labeled data is a nontrivial task as labeling data 
requires time and a human expert. Thus, learning from unlabeled data is more 
desirable. Semi-supervised learning is learning with a small amount of labeled 
data and a large amount of unlabeled data (Zien, Scholkopf, & Chapelle, 2006). 
Recently, Rasmus et al. (2015) had shown that Ladder Networks, a semi-
supervised neural network scheme, are able to achieve a high classification rate 
while using only a few labeled samples on the Mixed National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (MNIST) dataset. In this paper, we use the Ladder 
Networks to classify the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining Tools Competition dataset (KDD 1999). Three well studied, supervised 
classifiers, a Deep Belief Network (DBN), a Support Vector Machine (SVM), and 
a Random Forest were used to classify KDD 1999. These supervised results serve 
as a baseline to compare with the Ladder Networks results. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
on the classifiers: Support Vector Machine, Random Forest, Deep Belief Network 
and Ladder Network. Section 3 describes our experiments and the results. Related 
Work is discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Support Vector Machine 
Support Vector machines are supervised learning models for classifying data. The 
goal of a SVM is to find the optimum margin that maximizes the distance 
between two target classes (Bishop, 2006; Schmidhuber, 2015; Hasan et al., 
2014). Essentially, a SVM tries to minimize the error of the distance between 
each point in each class and a dividing line. This is done by finding the shortest 
distance between two points in both classes. The line orthogonal to the shortest 
distance line is the dividing line. 
2.2 Random Forest 
Random forests are an ensemble of classification or regression trees. The random 
forest classifier works by partitioning the training set of the data into k subsets and 
constructing a decision tree out of each subset. All of the subsets are created by 
randomly selecting samples from the original set. Each decision tree is 
independent of all other decision trees.  
Each decision tree is made by randomly selecting m variables (features) out of 
all the variables and finding the best split on the selected variables. The best split 
is determined by the entropy or unpredictability of the variables. This is done at 
each node and continued until a node cannot be split further, leading to the leaf 
nodes. The testing data is then run through each tree and each tree provides a 
classification. The classifications of all the trees are then taken into account and 
the final classification of the forest is determined by the majority of the decision 
trees (Breiman, 2001). 
2
KSU Proceedings on Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Event 2 []
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2016/Practice/2
2.3 Deep Belief Neural Network 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) aim to imitate the biological process of a path 
of neurons being strengthened in the brain when a skill is learned. An ANN is 
composed of an input layer which represents the features of the data. The input 
layer is connected to one or more hidden layers where matrices of weighted 
connections are used to map the input to the output layer, which consists of the 
classes of the data. Essentially, a Neural Network learns by updating the matrices 
of weights until it is able to achieve a high accuracy in mapping the input layer to 
the output layer. A Deep Belief Neural Network (DBN) is a Neural Network with 
multiple hidden layers. It can be viewed as a stack of restricted Boltzmann 
machine (Hinton, 2009). Boltzmann machines are networks of neuron units that 
are symmetrically connected. These neuron units make stochastic decisions 
whether to be on or off (Hinton, 2007). A Boltzmann machine is restricted in that 
there are no connections between neural units of the same layer (Hinton, 
Osindero, & Teh, 2006).  
The DBN learns iteratively by updating the weights through the backward 
propagation algorithm. It works by calculating the net input for each neuron, 
which is the sum of (inputs * weights) for each connection leading into that 
neuron (Hecht-Nielsen, 1989). After that, the current output for each neuron is 
calculated using a logistic function. Then the error is calculated for all neurons. 
Finally, the error is fed back through the layers and the weights are updated to get 
a better accuracy.  
Figure 1. Ladder Network Architecture 
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 2.4 Ladder Networks 
Ladder Networks can be seen as nested denoising Auto-Encoders (dAE) that 
share lateral connections between the encoder and decoder at each layer. An auto-
encoder tries to learn a classifying function by mapping an input x to an output y. 
This is prone to over-fitting, which is the classifier having learned the training 
examples well, but cannot generalize to new data. To avoid over-fitting, noise is 
introduced, specifically a corrupted version of x is created and the auto-encoder 
tries to map it to the same y. With Ladder Networks, this happens at each layer, 
latent variables (variables inferred from observed variables) are used in layers 
beyond the input layer. Learning is based on minimizing the cost || (ẑ - z) ||2 where 
z is the original latent variable and ẑ is the reconstruction of the corrupted version 
of it. Each layer adds to a cost function for decoder d, Cd
 (l) =  ||z(l) - ẑ(l) ||2 which 
trains the layers to learn the denoising function ẑ(l)  = g(l) (z̃
(l),ẑ(l+1)) which maps 
the corrupted z̃(l)  onto the estimate without noise, ẑ(l). One of the parts 
differentiating Ladder Networks from dAEs are skip connections between the 
encoder and decoder at each layer that allow some of the details to be represented 
by the lower layers and the higher ones. An illustration of the architecture of a 3 
layer Ladder Network is shown in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, L =3. x → z(l) →z(2) →z(3) → y is the clean feedforward path, x → 
z̃{(l)} → z̃
(2)  → z̃
(3)  → ỹ is the corrupted feedforward path, and ẑ(3) → ẑ(2)  → ẑ(1)   
→ x̂ is the decoder. The decoder has denoising functions, g{(i)}  , and cost 
functions, Cd
(l), that try to minimize the difference between ẑ(l) and z(l) . See 
Rasmus et al., (2015) for more information on Ladder Networks. 
3. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS 
We analyzed the dataset used in the Third International Knowledge Discovery 
and Data Mining Tools Competition (KDD 1999), held in conjunction with the 
Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. The 
raw training data contains about 4GB of compressed packet capture data from 
seven weeks of network traffic. This data has been processed into approximately 
4.9 million connection records, with a set of 41 features. These features describe 
various aspects of a particular connection record, such as the service used, 
protocol, source bytes, and destination bytes (Fiore, Palmieri, Castiglione, & De 
Santis, 2013). Each sample is labeled as a normal or an abnormal connection. The 
abnormal connections fall into four main categories with subcategories based on 
the popular nomenclature of the specific attack at the time (e.g. Ping of Death) 
(Tavallaee, Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009). Table 1 describes both the categories 
and subcategories of malicious connections found in the KDD 1999 dataset.  
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The Random Forest and SVM classifiers were implemented using sci-kit learn 
(Pedregosa et al., 2011). For both classifiers data was cross-validated using K-fold 
cross validation (Refaeilzadeh, Tang, & Liu, 2009). Ten folds were used with the 
test evaluation at the final fold. The DBN was implemented using Theano and 
Blocks (Theano Development Team, 2016; van Merrënboer et al., 2015). The 
Ladder Network was implemented using Theano, Blocks and Fuel. Theano is a 
Python library used in creating and solving mathematical expressions; Blocks 
allows neural networks to be built on top of Theano; and Fuel provides the 
datasets to be used in machine learning methods. In order to use the KDD 1999 
dataset, the Fuel package for the Ladder Network had to be modified to allow for 
pre-processing. 
 
Major Categories Sub-Categories 
Denial of Service (DoS) Ping of Death, LAND, Neptune, 
Backscatter, Smurf, Teardrop 
User to Root (U2R) Buffer Overflow, Loadmodule, Perl, 
Rootkit 
Remote to Local (R2L) FTP write, password guessing, IMAP 
attacks, Multi-hop, PHF, Spy, 
Warezclient, Warezmaster 
Probing Ipsweeping, Nmap, Portsweeping, Satan 
Table 1. Categories of Malicious Behavior 
 
3.1 Supervised Classification 
A DBN, a Random Forest classifier, and a SVM classifier were used to analyze 
the KDD dataset. For each classifier, four tests were run varying the number of 
examples for each class. The tests were run requiring 10, 1000, 3000, and 5000 
examples per class. They correspond to 16, 9, 6, and 6 classes respectively. These 
classes include one normal class and the rest of the classes belong to 
subcategories of attacks. Our experiments differ from Salama et al. (2011) in that 
they used the four main categories for the abnormal classes. We decided to use 
the subcategories in order to classify specific types of attacks.  Two-thirds of the 
data was randomly selected for training and the rest for testing. The classification 
accuracy results are shown in Table 2. The time required for training and testing 
combined is shown in Table 3. 
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 Examples Accuracy % 
# per class # of classes SVM Random 
Forest 
DBN 
10 16 42% 87% 90% 
1000 9 76% 99% 95% 
3000 6 98% 99% 98% 
5000 6 97% 99% 98% 
Table 2. Accuracy of SVM, Random Forest, and DBN classifiers on KDD 1999 data. 
 
 Execution Time (sec.) 
Examples per 
class 
SVM Random Forest DBN 
10 .014 1.832 13.2 
1000 8.488 5.745 205.2 
3000 14.01 8.717 399.6 
5000 30.784 14.47 639.0 
Table 3. Time needed for runs of supervised classifiers (in seconds) 
 
The Random Forest classifier achieves a high accuracy on the second to fourth 
tests and does so in the shortest time. The DBN has fairly high accuracy for each 
test, when it is run for 1000 epochs with two hidden layers of 150 nodes each. 
However, compared with the other two methods, the DBN takes the longest time. 
 
3.2 Semi-Supervised Classification 
Two experiments were performed using Ladder Networks to classify the KDD 
1999 dataset. In the first experiment, four tests varying the number of examples 
required for each class, i.e. 10, 1000, 2000, and 5000 were run. The training data 
set includes both labeled and unlabeled examples. The ratio of labeled data is 
50%. The classification accuracy, training and testing time are given in Table 4. 
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Examples per 
class 
Accuracy Training Time Testing Time 
10 N/A N/A N/A 
1000 92.18% 12.4 0.3 
3000 98.13% 21.5 0.3 
5000 99.03% 21.8 0.4 
Table 4. Accuracy, testing, and training time (minutes) required for Ladder Network 
 
For the second experiment we used the dataset requiring 3000 examples in 
each class and changed the number of labeled examples in different tests from 60, 
600, 2400, 9600, and 12000. We keep the total number of data examples constant 
at 18000, among which 12000 were used for training and the rest for testing. The 
results are shown in Table 5. 
 
# labeled Percentage Accuracy Training Testing 
60 0.5% 97.35 26.1 0.3 
600 5.0% 99.06 26.6 0.3 
2400 20.% 98.78 26.6 0.3 
9600 80.0% 99.2 27.0 0.3 
12000 100% 99.18 27.0 0.3 
Table 5. Results of Ladder Network with 3000 samples per class and varying the number 
of labeled samples use, Training and Testing times in minutes. Percentage is from 
training set. 
 
The accuracy of the Ladder Networks increases as more examples are given 
per class. However, it achieves a fairly high accuracy (97.35%) even with just 60 
(0.5%) labeled examples, or 10 labeled examples per class. This is encouraging 
since it is good accuracy with few labeled examples, which is desirable for real 
world use. When using just 10 examples per class, a different architecture of the 
Ladder Network is required. Therefore, the test with 10 examples per class was 
not run. 
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The iterative DBN and Ladder Network take the longest to achieve their 
results. The Ladder Network was run for 50 epochs and it took 12.4 minutes for 
1000 examples per class. The other Ladder Network tests took over 20 minutes. 
Since retraining may take significant time, Ladder Networks may not be good for 
real-time intrusion detection, but for forensic analysis, they may still be practical. 
4. RELATED WORK 
All of the supervised classifiers we have used have their own semi-supervised 
versions. They have been used not for just intrusion detection, but also for image 
classification. There is also another hybrid classifier with SVM and DBN (Salama 
et al., 2011). In addition to different classifiers and different implementations of 
those classifiers, there is also an alternative to the KDD 1999 dataset available: 
the NSL-KDD dataset (Tavallaee et al., 2009).  
    Haweliya & Nigam (2014) used a semi-supervised SVM to classify the NSL-
KDD dataset. Their semi-supervised method consisted of self-training where the 
SVM is trained on labeled data and then is used to classify unlabeled data which 
is then used to further train the classifier as new labeled data. They also used 
multiple training methods to compare and achieved 91.9% accuracy at their 
highest. The problem with self-training is that incorrect classifications can 
reinforce themselves. Our semi-supervised Ladder Network method does not use 
questionable labels to train so the problem of self-training is prevented.  
Jadidi et al. (2013) use S4VM to classify network data. S4VM improves upon 
S3VM (the semi-supervised version of SVM) by creating diverse separators with 
large margins and low densities. They use 10\% labeled examples and achieve an 
accuracy as high as 93.76% on one of their datasets. 
Our method achieved accuracy as high as 99% with a smaller percentage of 
labeled data. However, for direct comparison, we need to run the Ladder Network 
on their packet based datasets with the same percentage of labeled examples. 
Tian & Gao (2009) used a Genetic Algorithm to optimize a Neural Network 
and help the neural network avoid finding local minimums and help converge 
faster. They used a small training set (100 examples) and achieved a low error 
rate. Their dataset was similar to the KDD 1999 dataset. This work is related to 
ours as it also achieves a low error while using a Neural Network to classify 
intrusions. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, Ladder Networks, a semi-supervised approach, was used in 
analyzing network data. To establish benchmarks, we used well-known, existing 
supervised learning methods for Network intrusion detection to classify the KDD 
1999 dataset: the Deep Belief Network, Support Vector Machine and Random 
Forest. Two experiments using the Ladder Network were conducted. In the first 
experiment, where the number of classes and examples per class were changed, 
the semi-supervised Ladder Network was able to perform well at network data 
classification in comparison to the supervised classifiers. In the second 
experiment, where the number of labeled examples was changed, the Ladder 
Network was able to maintain results above 90% with varying ratios of labeled 
and unlabeled examples. In the near future, we would like to use the Ladder 
Network on the NSL-KDD dataset and other, newer datasets. Other future work 
includes exploring what other feed-forward neural network architectures could be 
integrated with the Ladder Network structure to improve classification 
performance. 
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